Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy

摘要

The prevailing Cold War narrative says that a shared fear of massive retaliation, known as "deterrence," has prevented the use of nuclear weapons since 1945. This report challenges that notion, finding that nuclear weapons were almost used by mistake numerous times and "that the world has, indeed, been lucky." The report looks at historical cases of "near nuclear use" where the use of nuclear weapons was contemplated and nearly occurred due to "misjudgment and misperception." Examples of near use include the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when Russian submarine commanders considered the use of nuclear-armed torpedoes, and the failed Soviet coup in 1991 when President Mikhail Gorbachev lost control of the nuclear command "football" for three days. The report identifies reasons that nuclear weapons were not used in these cases, such as adequate decision-making time to identify misinformation and "the decisive role of individuals in following intuition and prudent decision-making, often in violation of protocol." The authors conclude that "the risk associated with nuclear weapons is high" and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, so will the risk of "inadvertent, accidental or deliberate detonation.