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Complexity of sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in a two-parallel household appliance supply chain model

机译:两平行家用电器供应链模型中销售工作和碳减排工作的复杂性

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This paper studies the complexity of sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in a Bertrand household appliance supply chain system. A two-parallel model consisting of a traditional supply chain without any carbon emission reduction effort and a low-carbon supply chain with carbon emission reduction effort is established. The chain to chain competition is analyzed in three scenarios, one of which is a horizontal Nash game, and the others are the traditional supply chain Stackelberg game and the low-carbon supply chain Stackelberg game. The optimal solutions of the horizontal Nash game and the Stackelberg game are obtained and three models' dynamic evolutions based on the bounded rationality are investigated. A dynamic Stackelberg game model with respect to five variables is proposed and investigated via the stable region, the bifurcation, and the maximum Lyapunov exponent. The profits of the two-parallel household appliance supply chains are compared in three dynamic game structures. An interesting phenomenon that the system will enter a six-cycle state after the two-cycle state and fall into chaos directly is discovered in the traditional supply chain Stackelberg game. Our results suggest that the adjustments of price would affect the stability and profits much more than the sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in all three game structures. Every supply chain should take the suitable adjustment speeds for the price and sales effort to keep the system in the stable state. Each adjustment should not exceed the domain of attraction. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:本文研究了Bertrand家用电器供应链系统中销售工作和减少碳排放工作的复杂性。建立了一个由两部分组成的并行模型,该模型由不进行任何碳减排努力的传统供应链和具有碳减排努力的低碳供应链组成。从三个场景分析了链到链的竞争,其中一个是横向纳什博弈,另一个是传统的供应链Stackelberg游戏和低碳供应链Stackelberg游戏。获得了水平纳什博弈和斯塔克伯格博弈的最优解,并基于有限理性研究了三个模型的动态演化。提出了关于五个变量的动态Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过稳定区域,分叉和最大Lyapunov指数进行了研究。在三个动态博弈结构中比较了两个平行的家用电器供应链的利润。在传统的供应链Stackelberg游戏中,发现了一个有趣的现象,即系统将在两个周期的状态之后进入六个周期的状态并直接陷入混乱。我们的结果表明,在所有三个博弈结构中,价格调整对稳定性和利润的影响远大于销售努力和碳减排努力。每个供应链都应针对价格和销售努力采取适当的调整速度,以使系统保持稳定状态。每次调整均不得超出吸引力范围。 (C)2018 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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