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Toward an epistemology of nano-technosciences

机译:迈向纳米技术科学的认识论

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摘要

This paper aims to contribute to the attempts to clarify and classify the vague notion of “technosciences” from a historical perspective. A key question that is raised is as follows: Does Francis Bacon, one of the founding fathers of the modern age, provide a hitherto largely undiscovered programmatic position, which might facilitate a more profound understanding of technosciences? The paper argues that nearly everything we need today for an ontologically well-informed epistemology of technoscience can be found in the works of Bacon—this position will be called epistemological real-constructivism. Rather than realist or constructivist, empiricist or rationalist, Bacon’s position can best be understood as real-constructivist since it challenges modern dichotomies. Reflection upon the contemporary relevance of Bacon could contribute to the expanding and critical discussion on technoscience. In the following I will reconstruct the term “technoscience”. My finding is that at least four different understandings or types of the term “technoscience” co-exist. In a second step, I will analyze and elaborate on Bacon’s epistemological position. I will identify central elements of the four different understandings in Bacon’s work. Finally, I will conclude that the epistemology of technoscience is, indeed, very old—it is the epistemological position put forward by Bacon.
机译:本文旨在从历史的角度为澄清和分类模糊的“技术科学”概念做出贡献。提出的一个关键问题如下:弗朗西斯·培根(Francis Bacon)是现代的开国元勋之一,是否提供了迄今未发现的程序化职位,这可能有助于对技术科学的更深刻理解?该论文认为,今天在培根的著作中几乎可以找到我们今天所需要的关于本体科学的技术科学认识论的一切,这一立场将被称为认识论的现实建构主义。培根的立场比现实主义者或建构主义者,经验主义者或理性主义者更能被理解为现实建构主义者,因为它挑战了现代的二分法。对培根当代意义的反思可能有助于对技术科学的扩大和批判性讨论。在下文中,我将重建术语“技术科学”。我的发现是,术语“技术科学”至少存在四种不同的理解或类型。第二步,我将分析和阐述培根的认识论立场。我将确定培根作品中四种不同理解的核心要素。最后,我将得出结论,技术科学的认识论确实很老,这是培根提出的认识论立场。

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