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Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a Trembling Hand Game

机译:意外结果指导颤抖之手游戏中的惩罚

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摘要

How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution.
机译:人们如何应对他人的意外行为?对事故的奖励和惩罚可能取决于演员的意图,或者取决于她带来的意外结果。但是,实验经济学中的现有范式不包括意外货币分配的可能性。我们在两人参与的经济博弈中探索结果和意图之间的平衡,在这种游戏中,货币分配是用“颤抖的手”进行的:也就是说,有时意图和结果不匹配。玩家1通过掷三个骰子之一在自己和玩家2之间分配$ 10。一个人死于自私的可能性很高,另一个人死于公平的可能性很高,而第三人则有慷慨大方的可能性。根据玩家1的选择,玩家2可以推断出自己的意图。但是,这三个骰子中的任何一个都可以产生三个可能结果中的任何一个。玩家2有机会通过增加或减少玩家1的收益来响应玩家1的分配。我们发现,玩家2的反应很大程度上受玩家1掷骰失败的意外结果影响。与控制条件的比较表明,在分配至少部分处于参与者1的控制之下的情况下,参与者2将惩罚参与者1造成无意的负面结果。另外,玩家2的反应受玩家1意图的影响。但是,玩家2倾向于更多地出于自私的意图而不是出于慷慨的意图来调节其反应。这种新颖的经济博弈为社会偏爱公平与报应的心理机制提供了新的见解。

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