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A New Solution Concept for the Ultimatum Game leading to the Golden Ratio

机译:最终通Game游戏的新解决方案概念导致黄金分割

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摘要

The Ultimatum Game is a paradigmatic two-player game. A proposer can offer a certain fraction of some valuable good. A responder can accept the offer or reject it, implying that the two players receive nothing. The only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is to only offer an infinitesimal amount and to accept this. However, this equilibrium is not in agreement with experimental observations, which show varying accepted offers around 40%. While some authors suggest that the fairest split of 50% vs. 50% would be explainable on theoretical grounds or by computer simulation, a few authors (including myself) have recently suggested that the Golden Ratio, about 0.618 vs. about 0.382, would be the solution, in striking agreement with observations. Here we propose a solution concept, based on an optimality approach and epistemic arguments, leading to that suggested solution. The optimality principle is explained both in an axiomatic way and by bargaining arguments, and the relation to Fibonacci numbers is outlined. Our presentation complements the Economic Harmony theory proposed by R. Suleiman and is based on infinite continued fractions. The results are likely to be important for the theory of fair salaries, justice theory and the predictive value of game theory.
机译:《最后通Game》是一款典型的两人游戏。提议者可以提供某些有价值的物品的一部分。响应者可以接受要约,也可以拒绝要约,这意味着两个参与者都没有得到任何回报。唯一完美的子博弈纳什均衡是仅提供一个无穷小数量并接受该数量。但是,这种平衡与实验观察结果不一致,实验观察结果显示接受报价的变化约为40%。虽然有些作者建议从理论上或通过计算机模拟可以解释50%与50%的最公平分配,但一些作者(包括我自己)最近建议黄金比例约为0.618对0.382。解决方案,与观察结果达成一致。在这里,我们基于最优方法和认知论证提出了一种解决方案概念,从而提出了建议的解决方案。最优原则以公理方式和议价方式进行了解释,并概述了与斐波那契数的关系。我们的演讲是对R. Suleiman提出的经济和谐理论的补充,它基于无限的连续分数。这些结果对于公平工资理论,正义理论和博弈论的预测价值可能具有重要意义。

著录项

  • 期刊名称 Scientific Reports
  • 作者

    Stefan Schuster;

  • 作者单位
  • 年(卷),期 -1(7),-1
  • 年度 -1
  • 页码 5642
  • 总页数 11
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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