市场竞争强度、管理层持股与股利分配--来自中国非金融类上市公司的经验证据

摘要

This paper selects an unbalanced panel data of 1208 Chinese non‐financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2013.Taking into consideration of the mechanism of external market competition ,it tests the effect of managerial ownership on the dividend dis‐tribution(including the quota and tendency) by applying the Tobit model and Probit model.The main evidences indicate as follows :there is an re‐lationship with inverted U‐shape between managerial ownership and dividend payment(or dividend policy) ,which means that ,in a certain range , the higher the management ownership ,the greater tendency and strength of dividend payment ;and once it exceeds a critical value ,its increase‐ment reduces the possibility and the quota of dividend distribution instead ;market competition has significant influences on the relationship be‐tween managerial ownership and dividend payment ,that is ,when market competition intensity increases ,the possibility and quota of dividend dis‐tribution increase with managerial ownership ;and vice versa .%选取2009—2013年中国沪深两市1208家非金融类上市公司为样本，运用Tobit模型和Probit模型，实证检验了管理层持股比例对股利分配（股利分配的额度和倾向性）的治理效应。结果显示：中国上市公司管理层持股与股利分配的关系曲线呈倒U型，即在一定范围内，管理层持股比例越高，上市公司股利发放的倾向性和力度就越大；而管理层持股比例一旦超过某一临界值，管理层持股比例的增加反而会降低股利发放的倾向性和力度；市场竞争对管理层持股的治理效应产生显著影响，体现为当竞争程度相对较高时管理层持股比例越高，则上市公司股利分配的可能性和分配额度越高。