“企业＋农户”模式下农业价值链融资稳定性研究--一个博弈的视角

摘要

This paper do some research on the stability of theagricultural Value Finance under the mode of peasant household and enterprise from the sight of game theory Firstly ,analyse the stability of build the agricultural Value Finance by building a Complete information static game model.It draws the following conclusions. The number of assets specificity ,compensation and quantity of agricultural products signed in the contract is big ,the mode will be stable. However ,the market’s quotation can decrease this stability. Secondly ,introducing into the KMRW model and Bayes theorem to do some further analysis under incomplete information. It draws that as long as the number of games is repeated enough during the in‐complete information ,Peasant household and Enterprise will maintain the stability of the financing model in order to obtain long‐term interests. In the end of the paper ,we put forward some policy suggestions according to the conclusion.%从博弈视角对农业价值链融资中“企业＋农户”的模式的稳定性进行研究。首先，建立完全信息静态博弈模型，定量分析该模型下融资稳定性的大小。得出资产专用性，违约金和签订的农产品数量越大，融资双方违约的可能性就越低，该模式融资的稳定性就越高。市场行情的好坏会使稳定性降低。接着，在不完全信息条件下引入K M RW模型并结合贝叶斯法则对该模式下融资的稳定性进行进一步分析。最后得出，在不完全信息条件下，只要博弈重复的次数足够，那么双方会为了获得长期利益而保持该融资模式的稳定。最后，针对得出的结论提出若干政策建议。