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两级供应链价格与碳减排策略决策及谈判协调机制

     

摘要

In this paper, in view of the supply chain composed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer and considering the price sensitivity and carbon emissions reduction preference of the product, we established the Stackelberg game model dominated by the manufacturer, compared the wholesaling price, carbon emissions reduction level and retailing price under distributive and centralized decision-making systems, and at the end, proposed three different negotiation mechanisms. Next, through a numerical example, we analyzed the carbon emissions reduction preference coefficient and carbon emissions reduction cost coefficient of the product on the equilibrium solution of the model and the profit of the supply chain members and then further discussed the effect of the earning sharing plus cost apportionment negotiation mechanism on the improvement of the environmental performance of the supply chain. The research indicated that the negotiation mechanism could not only improve the carbon emissions reduction level of the supply chain, but was also conducive to increasing the profit of it.%针对由单个制造商单个零售商构成的供应链,考虑产品需求具有价格敏感性和碳减排偏好性,建立了制造商处于主导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比了分散和集中决策下的批发价格、碳减排水平和零售价格,并提出三种不同的谈判协商机制。通过算例分析了产品的碳减排偏好系数和碳减排成本系数对均衡解和各成员利润的影响,并进一步讨论了收益共享加成本分担谈判协商机制对于改进供应链环境绩效的作用。研究表明,收益共享加成本分担谈判协商机制不仅有利于提高供应链的碳减排水平,而且有利于增加供应链的利润。

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