冷战初期美国对伊朗的心理战研究

摘要

In the early period of the Cold War, Iran became a hot battlefield between the U. S. and the USSR. In order to enable Iran to serve the American cold war strategy and became a stronghold to contain the Soviet expansion southward, both the Truman Administration and the Eisenhower Administra-tion adopted the fourth option, i.e., applying the propaganda-centered psychological warfare to implement the target of the U.S. policy toward Iran. Nevertheless, due to the wrong guideline and the application of the rigid ideology to deal with the complicated Iranian situation, the U. S. psychological warfare only a-chieved partial and periodical effect instead of the final success as the U. S. policymakers expected. Ap-plying the historical materialist viewpoint and with the help of the declassified U. S. governmental docu-ments, this paper aims to explore the U. S. psychological warfare toward Iran in the early period of the Cold War to help the readers to understand the U.S. psychological strategy toward Iran, the implementa-tion process, effect and features as well as the reasons of the failure of the U.S. psychological warfare to-ward Iran.%冷战初期，对伊朗的争夺是美苏冷战斗争的一个焦点。为了让伊朗服务于美国的全球冷战战略，成为遏制苏联南下的桥头堡，美国杜鲁门政府和艾森豪威尔政府除了采取军事、外交、经济策略外，还采用了“第四种选择”，即以宣传为主的心理战来实现对伊朗的政策目标。但是，由于指导思想的错误，加之以僵化的冷战意识形态应对复杂的伊朗局势，美国对伊朗心理战只取得了短期和局部的成效，无法取得美国冷战决策者们预期的终极效果。运用历史唯物主义的观点，借助近年来解密的美国政府档案文件，对冷战初期美国对伊朗心理战进行探讨，有助于了解美国对伊朗的心理战略、实施过程、特点、成效以及未能取得预期效果的原因。