博弈视角下企业与注册会计师会计诚信问题研究

摘要

This paper established the mixed strategy game model of incomplete information and non‐co‐operation between company and certified public accountant form the perspective of the Game Theory .It obtained the model’s corresponding Nash equilibrium solution ,and drew the following conclusion:compa‐ny’s optimal integrity probability has the same movements with the CSRC’s punishment and supervision probability ,and has the reverse movements with CPA’s audit cost and extraneous income .Finally ,this paper suggested that we can improve CSRC’s supervision probability and reshape the CPA’s integrity to provide references and suggestions on solving the accounting integrity issue .%通过构建企业与注册会计师之间的不完全信息非合作混合策略博弈模型，求出纳什均衡解，主要得出企业会计诚信概率与受罚成本和受罚概率成正比，与注册会计师审计成本及其与企业合谋造假获得的额外收益成反比的结论。据此从健全会计准则制度提高证监会监管力度和重塑注册会计师诚信提升外部审计效果两个大的方面提出对策。