Based on the behavioral theory of the firm and the performance feedback theory, this paper studies the allocation of authority among family members. We got the following results; first, when the performance of the firm is below the aspiration, the family owner tends to ravel out the puzzledom instead of giving up the control of the family firm, and tends to anneal the ablest nuclear family member as the performance difference increases. Second, when the performance of the firm is above the aspiration, the family owner tends to allocate the authority to his/her ablest family agent in order to realize the family dynasty, and his/her nuclear family members can get more authority than extended family members as the performance difference increases. Third, institutions moderate the relationship between the aspiration and the allocation of authority among family members, in which the underdeveloped institution decreases the possibility of allocating the authority to the able nuclear family members and increases the possibility of allocating the authority to the able extended family members since authority is a negative product in the underdeveloped institution.%基于企业行为理论,尤其是业绩反馈理论对家族成员内部的权威配置进行了理论分析,并基于中国上市公司的数据进行了实证检验,主要得到以下几个方面的结论:1)在企业实际业绩未达到经营期望水平时,业绩的落差越大则家族企业主越倾向于采取拯救行为而不是放弃对家族企业的控制,同时倾向于砺练最有能力的核心家庭成员.2)在企业的实际业绩超过经营期望水平时,超额收益越高则家族企业主越倾向于将权威配置给经营能力最强的家族代理人以实现家族王朝梦想,同时还会产生一种亲缘效应,即对核心家庭成员而不是远亲成员赋予更多的权威.3)制度环境对家族成员内部权威的配置产生了显著的调节作用,即在制度环境不规范情况下,家族企业主出于仁慈倾向于将具有“负产品”性质的权威配置给有能力的远亲成员而不是有能力的核心家庭成员.
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