非正规金融低违约率的动因：基于契约治理的解释

摘要

本文基于契约治理视角，阐释了非正规金融保持低违约率的动因，并结合茅于轼在山西省龙头村的信贷扶贫案例，对非正规金融保持低违约率进行经验验证。研究表明，非正规金融内生于特定的社会网络，社会资本机制、信誉机制、群体贷款或连带责任以及灵活担保机制，有助于克服信贷过程中的道德风险与机会主义行为，降低借款人的违约率。%Based on the perspective of contractual governance, the paper explains the motivation of the informal ifnanceto maintain a low default rate, and combined with Mao Yushi's case on credit poverty alleviation in the Longtou Village of Shanxi Province, gives the empirical veriifcation on the low default rates. the paper has shown that non-formal ifnances are born within speciifc social networks, and therefore social capital system, reputation, group loam or joint liability, lfexible guarantees mechanism, will help overcome the moral hazard and opportunistic behavior associated with lending, and ifnally reducing the borrower's delinquencies.