考虑内在动机的工作设计与激励的模型分析

摘要

An effective job design can help coordinate incentives and manage employee' s behaviors. Appropriate job design can coordinate incentive, manage employee' s behavior, motivate employee, and obtain more benefits. There are two kinds of job design; job specialization and job enlargement. Job specialization can enhance efficiency, but may lower satisfaction and increase turnover. On the contrary, job enlargement has no efficiency advantages, but can indirectly increase an employee' s intrinsic motivation and performance. An enterprise needs to make a trade-off between job specialization and job enlargement.This paper studies optimal job designs considering intrinsic motivation based on the principal-agent theory. The paper establishes two incentive models; basic models without intrinsic motivation, and advanced model including intrinsic motivation.The equilibrium outcomes of our research model show that the optimal way of job design is specialization when employees do not have intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, the intensity of an agent' intrinsic motivation, the disparity of task monitoring difficulty and the risk costs of agents can affect the optimization of job design. Moreover, job enlargement is better than job specialization depending on risk costs. When the optimization of job enlargement is permanently achieved, the disparity of task monitoring difficulty can be reduced.%考虑工作设计的两种形式:工作专业化与工作扩大化.运用委托代理理论,研究考虑内在动机的企业最佳工作设计的选择问题.模型给出了不同情况下的均衡结果,根据均衡结果做进一步分析,得出结论:当员工不具备内在动机时,企业应该选择工作专业化；当员工具备内在动机时,工作设计的曩优选择同时受代理人的内在动机强度、工作间监督难度的差异程度以及风险成本影响,并且随着工作间监督难度差距的编小,工作扩大化由依赖于风险成本有条件的优于工作专业化,变为恒优于工作专业化.