Merger and acquisition (M&A) is one of main approaches for corporate development in every phase of the corporate life cycle. M&A not only creates values for the acquirer and the acquired, but also upgrades industries for the country. Nevertheless, M&A's deals do not always succeed. Empirical research shows that the acquirer's improper valuation of the target is the major reason for failure. Hence, it is of particular significance to establish a reasonable framework of M&A's valuation for the acquirer.There are many approaches to calculate M&A's valuation, including cost approach, market approach, income approach, and real option approach, etc. These approaches involve only the valuation of the target. All these valuation approaches involves only two companies; acquirer and target. Therefore, these approaches only consider M&A's direct influences on the acquirer and the target. However, the empirical research indicates that M&A deals also have significant influences on the supply chain network and the performances of network members such as suppliers and buyers. The supply chain network and its members will always give feedback to the new firm merged by the acquirer and the target. Hence, supply chain network and its influence on M&A deals should be taken seriously in the analytical framework of M&A valuation.In this paper, we use one central firm and its suppliers as the analytical landscape of an M&A deal. The analysis of M&A deal is integrated into a profit sharing model between the central firm and its suppliers, which can be researched by a multilateral analytical framework. The adopted methods include non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory that adopt Nash bargaining model and Shapley value. The analysis includes three steps. In the first step, a multilateral negotiation model is proposed based on the profit sharing model of supply chain. In the second step, the equilibrium of multilateral negotiation among the central firm and its suppliers is discussed by considering member's strategic moves before and after an M&A deal. In the third step, we consider each member's strategic dynamics in the M&A process.The research has many findings. First finding is that the profit of both the central firm and its suppliers after the merger is derived by using Nash bargaining theory and multi-party cooperative game theory when the central firm merges with its chosen supplier one at a time. It should be particularly pointed out that each supplier gains the same profit in the equilibrium. Then, the central firm and its supplier's profit after the merger is derived when the central firm and its suppliers merger simultaneously and the BATNA framework ischosen in the merger negotiation. Finally, the equilibrium of the interactive dynamics of supply chain and the profit gained by members in the equilibrium are derived when the central firm and its suppliers try their best to move strategically. Meanwhile, some examples are presented to further illuminate the derived results.The results indicate that members' interactions in supply chain have a significant influence on the error between classical merger valuations when other suppliers do not join the merger. The pursuit of M&A deal does not only have positive effects such as cost decrease, but also have the negative effect caused by the change of the supply chain network. This kind of negative effect will decrease the profit expectations of M&A deals. Hence, this finding gives a reasonable explanation for the error between classical merger valuations and real data. This paper presents analytical M&A frameworks based upon the multilateral interactions, and further improves the quality of deal evaluations in the decision-making process of M&A.%以并购参与方所在供应链为研究视角,探讨了买方与多个供应商并购分析框架.首先,得出多种框架下并购前后各方所获利润,并数值模拟供应链环境变化对买方利润的影响；其次,在比较基础上给出供应链各方互动下的均衡.结果表明,并购交易的实施和供应链各方互动共同影响并购各方和其余各方所获利润,且互动削弱了并购产生的正向协同效应.本文给出了供应链各方互动下的并购分析框架,进一步完善了并购决策过程中的交易评估内容.
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