With the rapid development of E-Commerce, using Internet as a sales channel has received much attention from both the academy and industry. An increased number of companies have used Internet sales channels to reduce costs and expand market. Because of the existence of physical retail stores, Internet sales channels can inevitably lead to channel competition and conflicts, which are both an opportunity and a challenge for companies. The goal of this dissertation is to understand the operating mechanism of dual-channel supply chains and improve their operating efficiency. In this paper the interaction between supply chain members is analyzed through a game model, and the source of the ineffectiveness in dual-channel supply chains is explored and measured. In the end, an optimization and coordination mechanism is proposed.We first consider a centralized system in which all decisions are centralized to maximize performance for the entire supply chain. For instance, a manufacturer is vertically integrated with its retailers in the retailing channel. The vertical integration enables the manufacturer to control both retail price and direct sale price. The centralized system solution serves as a benchmark for the decentralized setting. We then consider a decentralized supply chain using the Stackelberg game. In the decentralized setting, both manufacturer and retailer make their own decisions to maximize individual profits. It is assumed that information on each player's demand function, cost structure, and decision rules is a common knowledge for all the parties concerned. The decision process follows the sequence: (1) a manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader determines the wholesale price and the direct sale price, and (2) a retailer as the follower sets his own optimal retail price based on the manufacturer's decisions. Furthermore, to coordinate the decentralized dual-channel supply chain we propose a new contract as the compensation mechanism to coordinate dual-channel supply chains. In this compensation mechanism, a manufacturer gives its retailers a fraction of revenues generated by the direct channel. Then the manufacturer charges a "franchise fee" to compensate its retailers. Finally, the effectiveness of this compensation mechanism on channel coordination is verified through a numerical example.This study shows that in the dual-channel supply chain the optimal price of the traditional channel under the decentralized system is higher than that under the centralized system. Moreover, in the decentralized system the profit of the entire supply chain is less than that in the centralized system. Therefore, the supply chain system is inefficient. We also find that a manufacturer can motivate its retailers to cooperate by providing compensation mechanisms that not only maximizes the profit of the dual-channel supply chain but also ensure both supply chain members achieve a win-win situation.The demand function is assumed to be particular in this paper. Although this particular demand model has been used extensively in the economics and marketing literature, it is still worth studying demand uncertainty. In this paper, we assume that all information is known to the direct channel and the traditional channel. However, the information could be incomplete. Therefore, we can explore the demand uncertainty and asymmetric information situations for further research.%构建了电子商务环境下由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,分析、比较了集中式决策与分散式决策下双渠道供应链的最优价格,从电子渠道与传统渠道合作的角度出发,研究了双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略,论证了这种补偿策略能够实现双渠道供应链协调,且在一定范围内可以保证双渠道供应链成员的双赢.最后通过算例分析,进一步检验了所设计的补偿策略对双渠道供应链协调的有效性.
展开▼
