Due to the rapid development of e-commerce,consumers' behavior for product preference can be accurately acquired by the firm.As such,targeted advertising can be directly sent to potential consumers.The range of targeted population can determine the accuracy of targeted advertising and directly affect a firm's profit.To illustrate the inner mechanism of targeted advertising,the targeting extent is defined as an endogenous variable to describe the accuracy of targeted advertising,which can be improved by investment,such as purchasing new targeting technologies and big data services.In this study,we explore the role of targeting extent and its effect on firm's equilibrium profit,and demonstrate whether the increase of targeting extent can intensify fierce market competition.Our results reveal the accurate attributes of targeted advertising,which is beneficial for the effective screening of advertising audience and optimization of advertising expenditure by regulating targeting extent.In the first part,we assume that duopolistic firms compete in the market and produce homogeneous products.In the model assumption,both firms own equal proportion of loyal consumers and comparison consumers.Consumers may purchase products only after receiving the advertisement from the firm.In the second part,we establish a mathematical model with duopolistic firms competing in mass advertising.The CDF of mixed pricing strategy and equilibrium advertising intensity are described.The expected value of equilibrium price shows inverse proportion with the number of consumers seeking comparison shopping.Our results indicate that the changes of marketing size and advertising cost will directly affect a firm's equilibrium profit.In the third part,we establish a theoretical model with duopolistic firms competing in targeted advertising.Our results indicate that the targeting extent plays a critical role in the regulation of a firm's profit.With the improvement of targeting extent,the firm may send targeted advertising to more potential consumers and firm's equilibrium profit may be improved.However,when the targeting extent is too high,the price competition between firms in the competitive market will be intensified,and a firm's equilibrium profit will be reduced.In the fourth part,we extend our model to the varying effect of targeting extent on firm's profit with mismatch loss and investment.Our results indicate that the mismatch loss increases with the enlargement of targeting extent,which means a firm's mismatch loss might reduce a firm's profit to some extent.Likewise,the investment of targeting extent will cause a contradiction between higher targeting extent and profit.The targeting extent plays a bidirectional regulatory role in a firm's equilibrium profit.In the fifth part,we analyze the equilibrium results on duopolistic firms competing with distinct advertising strategies.We prove that targeting extent will directly affect the rival's price decision and equilibrium profit by using mass advertising.When the targeting extent is lower than the critical value,the firm's profit using targeted advertising may be lower than that of mass advertising.In conclusion,the targeting extent of targeted advertising can be used as an information lever for price competition and advertising competition,and its bidirectional regulatory effect may play a critical role in market competition and firm development.%企业投放定向广告的目标群体范围决定了广告投放的精准性并直接影响产品价格和企业利润.针对定向广告的精准性投放问题,本文将定向广域度作为决策变量,运用博弈论和产业组织理论研究双寡头市场环境下定向广域度变化对企业均衡利润的影响.建立了定向广域度对产品价格和企业均衡利润调节的理论模型,构建了定向广域度投资对企业利润影响的优化模型,并通过数值仿真予以验证.结果表明:定向广域度对企业均衡利润呈现双向调节作用,是企业进行价格竞争和广告竞争的有效杠杆.当定向广域度较小时,随着定向广域度的提高,企业能将定向广告投向更多潜在客户以增加企业利润;而当定向广域度过高时,企业在竞争市场的价格竞争加剧,企业的利润下降;当对定向广域度的投资低于临界值时,企业采取定向广告的收益低于大众广告.本研究揭示了定向广告精准性的属性特征,有助于企业通过调节定向广域度以实现对广告受众的有效筛选和优化企业的广告支出.
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