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重大工程两类监理模式合谋防范研究

         

摘要

The supervision system is an important path to improve the quality of mega infrastructure projects. In china,two different types of supervision modes exist in the construction practice,namely "big owner,small supervisor" and "small owner,big supervisor". These two modes form different types of principal-agent relationship and collusion conditions in practice. Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs a game model for the government,owner,contractors and supervisor in case of different conspiracy situations,and calculates the optimal probability of conspiracy and the optimal supervision probability of government. Subsequently, this paper proposes a corresponding conspiracy prevention mechanisms for different situations. The results show that the government should introduce a third-party review agency to reduce the moral hazard of owner under the mode of "big owner,small supervisor" and construct the reputation system to restrain the collusion of supervisor under the mode of "small owner,big supervisor".%工程监理制是提高工程质量的关键路径.我国工程实践中形成了"大业主,小监理"和"小业主,大监理"两种模式,两类监理模式形成不同的委托代理关系和合谋情形.针对两类监理模式,基于演化博弈论构建合谋情形下的政府、业主、承包商和监理博弈模型,通过计算实验得到合谋主体最优合谋概率和政府最优监管概率,据此设计相应的合谋防范机制,即"大业主,小监理"模式下,政府引入第三方审查机构降低业主的道德风险;"小业主,大监理"模式下,政府通过构建监理市场声誉体系约束监理合谋行为.

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