基于博弈论的建设工程项目承包商与监理合谋问题研究

摘要

This paper analyzes the collusion between the contractor and supervision engineer whereby the focus is on the contractor's moral hazard by using a multi-period complete information game. The collusion between the contractor and the supervision engineer makes the contractor to avoid bearing an additional cost arising from his ex-ante behavior, which triggers the contractor's moral hazard. Penalty policy introduced to penalize the supervision engineer who colludes with contractor may be no valid if the supervision engineer is protected by limited liability. This paper finally analyzes the mechanism that the qualification management for supervision engineer deterring the collusion and moral hazard in construction project.%运用多期完全信息动态博弈模型分析建设工程项目中承包商和监理之间的合谋条件及其对承包商道德风险行为的影响。承包商和监理事后合谋可以使承包商不需承担其事前道德风险行为引起的返工成本，从而引发承包商事前的道德风险行为。在此基础上分析监理有限责任对罚款政策有效性的影响，并研究监理资质管理对抑制监理和承包商合谋乃至承包商道德风险的作用机制。