In the construction project in China,the owner often attempts to transfer excess cost generated due to his/her negligence in performing obligations onto the contractor,which may trigger ex-ante moral hazard and ex-post contract breach by the contractor and then decrease the project efficiency.This paper uses game theory to formulate contract model for construction projects and analyzes the mechanisms that generate double moral hazards where both the owner and the contractor are involved as well as the impact of penalty.The results show that neither the contractor bearing all the cost overrun risk nor the owner setting penalty can restrain the occurrence of double moral hazard and contract breach at the same time.At last,the optimal cost overrun risk sharing mechanism is designed to realize both ex-ante and ex-post project efficiency.%在建设工程项目中,业主可能会将自身低努力水平(业主道德风险)导致的超支成本转嫁给承包商,从而引发承包商事前道德风险和事后违约行为的发生,使项目效率降低.运用博弈论构建建设工程契约模型,分析业主与承包商的双边道德风险发生机制以及违约金的作用.结果表明,承包商完全承担成本超支风险及业主自由设置违约金均不能同时抑制双边道德风险和承包商违约的发生;通过设计最优风险分担机制,不仅可以促进业主设置社会最优违约金,而且可以同时实现项目的事前和事后效率.
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