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Information Technology Outsourcing Incentive Research of Bilateral Moral Hazard of Output Elasticity

机译:产出弹性的双边道德风险的信息技术外包激励研究

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The study constructs general motivation model of technology outsourcing of bilateral moral hazard and mainly analyzes impact that principal and agent’s output elasticity influence on sharing ratio and variable profit. The main conclusions are as following: Firstly, sharing ratio is determined by output elasticity, the side that owns bigger output elasticity will have higher sharing proportion from the output, especially when their output elasticity equal, sharing ratio is 0.5; secondly, respective variable profit also depends on output elasticity, the side that owns bigger output elasticity will have more variable profit.
机译:该研究构建了双边道德风险技术外包的一般动机模型,并主要分析了委托人和代理人的输出弹性对共享比率和可变利润的影响。主要结论如下:第一,分配比由输出弹性决定,拥有较大输出弹性的那一侧将具有较高的输出分配比,特别是当它们的输出弹性相等时,分配比为0.5。其次,各自的可变利润也取决于产出弹性,拥有较大产出弹性的一方将具有更多的可变利益。

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