针对中国家族企业内部控制对投资效率的治理作用问题，以2010—2013年上市家族企业为研究样本，从内部控制这一视角出发，结合家族企业特征引入高管配置要素，将微观的内部控制与宏观的公司治理结合起来，系统考察企业的非效率投资与内部控制之间的关系。研究结果表明：在其他条件一定的情况下，内部控制能有效抑制企业的非效率投资，且对于高管集权的家族企业，这种抑制作用得到大大增强，反之则抑制作用不明显。此外，当高管由家族人员担任时，内部控制对非效率投资的抑制作用得到显著的提升，而当高管由非家族人员担任时，这种抑制作用并不显著。%The Chinese family businesses are at the turning point of transformation, and the governance issues and decision making risks are the key impediments to their development. In order to explore the governance role of internal control in family businesses’ inefficient investment, this paper uses 2010—2013 sample data from listed family businesses to systematically study the relationship between the inefficient investment and the internal control from the unique perspective of internal control. The study combines the micro internal control with the macro corporate governance by introducing the managerial distribution factors in view of family business characteristics. The result shows that in the same circumstances, the internal control effectively restrains inefficient investment. This observation is particularly applied to the businesses with concentration of managerial power in contrast with those with decentralization of managerial power. In addition, such inhibitory effect can be enhanced significantly when family members acting as top managers. In turn, such inhibitory effect is non-significant in the businesses with non-family managers.
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