信息不对称下企业集团母子公司管控失效分析

摘要

In business groups,the control to the subsidiary companies by parent companies is characterized as entrusting and agent relationship. In this relationship,the parent companies are in the inferior position in the sense of information acquisition,leading to information asymmetry. This information asymmetry results in supervision invalidation to the subsidiary companies by parent companies. With this observation,detailed analysis for supervision invalidation of strategy control,finance control,and human resource control is carried out. Based on the analysis,suggestions are proposed to improve the supervision effectiveness.%委托代理关系贯穿于企业集团母子公司管控的整个过程,且母公司处于信息劣势的地位,这必然会影响到母公司对子公司的管控效果.从信息不对称的角度分析母子公司管控失效原因,得出信息不对称是企业集团母子公司管控失效的根本原因,并分别从战略管控、财务管控、人力资源管控方面深入剖析了信息不对称给管控带来的后果,最后提出了应对母子公司管控失效的建议.