IT服务外包关系中的正式契约、关系契约及交互关系研究

摘要

Based on principal agent theory,the paper develops a multi-task model of repeated interaction between a buyer and a vendor in IT outsourcing relationships.The model allows for the impact of the discount rate,the weight of the unverifiable outcomes relative to the buyer’s payoff,verifiability level and contract cost on contracts structure and interaction of formal contracts and relational contracts.The conclusions imply that if the discount rate is very high,verifiability level contract cost is not very high,then two types of incentives can function as complements,if the discount rate is very high and contract cost is very high,then two types of incentives can function as substitutes.If the discount rate is not very high,joint use of two types will complement the function of single relational contracts.When the more the buyers overweight the innovational task and big⁃ger divergence of innovational service values,the more the buyers regulate innovational service by relational incentives.%　　文章运用了委托—代理理论，通过多任务环境下的重复博弈模型来分析信息技术外包关系中贴现因子、创新性任务的重要程度和产出价值差距，可证实产出的可证实水平和契约成本对契约选择以及正式契约和关系契约的交互关系的影响。研究表明，当贴现因子很高，可证实水平和契约成本不很高时，正式契约与关系契约是互补关系；当贴现因子很高，过高的可证实水平引致契约成本很高时，关系契约与正式契约是替代关系。当贴现因子较高，正式契约和关系契约的联合作用比单独使用更有效，二者存在互补关系。如果外包企业对创新性任务越看重，创新性产出价值差距越大，越容易依赖关系契约来激励创新性产出。