考虑供应链入侵的渠道选择与Stackelberg博弈分析

摘要

In order to study the effect of supply chain entry on supply chain members′channel selection and decision-making, this paper considers a two-stage supply chain system composed of an incumbent supplier, a potential incursive supplier and an incumbent retailer.By analyzing the Stackelberg game models under different structures, the results show that supply chain entry will reduce the suppliers′wholesale prices and retail prices of products, and the different struc-tures of supply chain leads to the difference of influence of competence between channel or product on members′decision and benefit .Under some circumstances, increased competition will benefit the members of the supply chain.Further-more, retailer′s optimal selection is to sale these two competing products at the same time, and the incumbent supplier and potential incursive supplier will benefit from the incumbent supplier′s selection by opening direct channel invading the retail market.%为研究供应链入侵对供应链成员渠道选择及决策的影响, 本文考虑了一个由在位供应商、潜在入侵供应商和在位零售商组成的两阶段供应链系统. 通过不同结构下的Stackelberg 博弈模型分析发现, 供应链入侵会使供应商的批发价格和产品的零售价格都有所降低, 然而供应链结构的不同导致渠道或产品之间的竞争对供应链成员的决策和收益的影响不同; 在一定情况下,竞争加剧会使供应链成员获利, 并且零售商的最优选择是同时销售两种竞争性的产品, 而在位供应商通过开通直销渠道入侵零售市场对在位供应商和潜在入侵供应商都有利.