基于零售商延保服务的竞争性制造商两部定价合同决策

摘要

构建两个竞争性制造商共用一个零售商的供应链模型,其中零售商销售有偿延保服务.考虑制造商的两个纵向合同选择策略:批发价格合同和两部定价合同,以批发价格合同为基准,研究制造商两部定价合同的占优性设计机制,揭示零售商延保和市场竞争对制造商两部定价合同选择均衡的影响.研究表明:合同选择均衡为两个制造商同时采用两部定价合同;均衡的两部定价合同能够协调供应链并实现零售商利润Pareto改进;当市场竞争强度相对较低且延保期低于严重依赖于延保敏感系数的特定阈值时,存在占优固定费用均衡区域,如果固定费用设置在该区域内,则均衡的两部定价合同能够实现制造商利润Pareto改进.%This study proposes a supply chain model consisting of two competing manufacturers and one common retailer,where the retailer provides pay-needed extended warranties for the products sold.Each manufacturer has two types of vertical contract strategy options,either a wholesale price or a two-part tariff contract.Taking the wholesale price as the benchmark,the research aims to study the dominant design mechanism for each manufacturer's two-part contract,and reveal how retailers' extended warranties and market competition affect the two-part tariff contract choice equilibrium.The results show that both manufacturers conducting two-part tariff contract are found to be the equilibrium of the contract choice.The equilibrium two-part tariff contracts coordinate the total supply chain system and profit the retailer.When market competition is not intense and extended warranty length is lower than certain threshold which depends on extended warranty sensitivity parameter significantly,there exists the dominant fixed fee equilibrium region.If the fixed fee parameters are set in the dominant fixed fee equilibrium region,then the equilibrium two-part tariff contracts profit the manufacturers.