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Pricing and Inventory Control in Dual-channel Network with One Manufacturer and One Retailer.

机译:具有一个制造商和一个零售商的双渠道网络中的定价和库存控制。

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摘要

The study on multi-channel problems has been one of the most active research fields in recent years. In this paper, we consider a dual-channel network problem with one manufacture and one retailer. The manufacturer, acting as the Stackelberg leader, sells a single type of product through a traditional channel to the retailer and/or through a direct channel to customers. The retailer, acting as the follower, operates a Newsvendor model, ordering from the manufacturer and selling to the customers. We study the problem with the deterministic demand.;We develop an efficient algorithm to find the joint optimal policy for three prices: the wholesale price, the retail price in the traditional channel and the selling price in the direct channel. Our framework involves four different operational scenarios: the dual-channel scenario, the traditional-channel-only scenario, the direct-channel- only scenario, and the "equal pricing" scenario in which the wholesale price is equal to the selling price in the direct channel. We provide some criteria to identify different operational scenarios, and compare the performance of the four operational scenarios through numerical analysis. The scenario using dual channel possesses much more complementary effect between two channels than the performance in the "equal pricing" scenario. This observation calibrates some arguments based on the references only considering the "equal pricing" scenario. In addition, we have also examined a vertically integrated firm that operates a dual-channel supply chain. This vertically integrated firm is a centralized decision maker that decides two selling prices for the dual channels simultaneously. We have also compared the performance of the four scenarios with the performance of the integrated firm through numerical analysis.;We also consider stochastic demands for the dual-channel problem with one manufacturer and one retailer. In addition to pricing decisions, the manufacturer and the retailer also make inventory decisions (The retailer decides order quantity.) in the stochastic-demand problem. In our model, we consider exogenous wholesale price. There are four decision variables in our model: the retailer price, the direct channel price, the production capacity of the manufacturer, and the order quantity of retailer. We have developed a mechanism based on the chain rule to obtain the solutions one by one for these four decision variables. Given the wholesale price and the selling price in direct channel, we have obtained the retailer's order quantity and the retail price in the traditional channel. We have also obtained the optimal inventory capacity and the optimal direct price for the manufacturer given the retailer's best response for its order quantity and retail price. we also describe the optimal policy and compare the performance with regards to the retailer's order quantity through numerical analysis. We find that the manufacturer's profit is convex over the retailer's safety stock (order quantity), which indicates that an unique optimal wholesale price may not exist to maximize manufacturer's profit.
机译:近年来,关于多渠道问题的研究一直是最活跃的研究领域之一。在本文中,我们考虑一个制造商和一个零售商的双通道网络问题。制造商作为Stackelberg的领导者,通过传统渠道向零售商和/或通过直接渠道向客户销售单一类型的产品。零售商作为追随者,运行新闻供应商模型,从制造商处订购并销售给客户。我们研究了具有确定性需求的问题。我们开发了一种有效的算法来找到三种价格的联合最优策略:批发价格,传统渠道中的零售价格和直接渠道中的销售价格。我们的框架涉及四个不同的操作方案:双通道方案,仅传统通道方案,仅直接通道方案和“等价”方案,其中批发价等于销售价格。直接渠道。我们提供了一些标准来识别不同的操作方案,并通过数值分析比较这四个操作方案的性能。使用双通道的方案与“等价”方案中的性能相比,在两个通道之间具有互补的效果。此观察仅根据“平等定价”方案,根据参考文献对某些参数进行了校准。此外,我们还研究了经营双渠道供应链的垂直整合公司。这家垂直整合的公司是一个集中决策者,可以同时确定双渠道的两个销售价格。我们还通过数值分析将这四种情况的绩效与综合公司的绩效进行了比较。;我们还考虑了具有一个制造商和一个零售商的双渠道问题的随机需求。除了定价决策外,制造商和零售商还针对随机需求问题做出库存决策(零售商确定订单数量)。在我们的模型中,我们考虑外生批发价格。我们的模型中有四个决策变量:零售商价格,直接渠道价格,制造商的生产能力以及零售商的订单数量。我们已经开发了一种基于链式规则的机制,可以针对这四个决策变量逐一获取解决方案。鉴于直接渠道的批发价和销售价,我们获得了传统渠道中零售商的订购数量和零售价。考虑到零售商对其订单数量和零售价格的最佳响应,我们还为制造商获得了最佳的库存容量和最佳的直接价格。我们还描述了最佳策略,并通过数值分析比较了零售商订购数量的性能。我们发现制造商的利润超过零售商的安全库存(订单数量),这表明可能不存在唯一的最佳批发价格以最大化制造商的利润。

著录项

  • 作者

    Pan, Zhicong.;

  • 作者单位

    Singapore Management University (Singapore).;

  • 授予单位 Singapore Management University (Singapore).;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.;Economics General.
  • 学位 M.Sc.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 79 p.
  • 总页数 79
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:44:54

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