基于顾客风险规避度,构建了延保服务需求函数,并运用Stackelberg主从博弈,分别构建了制造商通过零售渠道和直销渠道销售延保服务的利润模型,结合数值算例,比较分析了在双边际效应及互补效应共同作用下,延保服务的服务水平对2种销售模式下制造商利润的影响.研究发现:延保服务的服务水平对制造商2种销售模式下利润的影响符合边际效益递减规律.服务水平对2种渠道下制造商延保服务销售渠道选择的影响是分段的,服务水平较低时制造商选择零售渠道销售延保服务较为有利,而服务水平较高时制造商选择直销渠道销售延保服务更为有利.%A demand function for extended warranty is constructed based on consumer's risk aversion lev-el. Then, by using Stackelberg game analysis, manufacturer's profit models under both direct and retail channels are built. In considering double marginal and complementary effect, the impact of extended war-ranty service level on manufacturers' profit is analyzed by combining numerical examples. Results show that the impact of service level on manufacturers' profit for both channels is consistent with the diminishing marginal utility. Due to the combination of complementary effect and double marginal effect, service level has different effect on manufacturers' channel selection for extended warranty at different level. The optimal choice for manufacturers is to sell extended warranty through retail channel when service level is low, and to sell it through direct channel when service level is high.
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