考虑中小企业收益的存货质押融资风险控制

摘要

Inventory financing is a new kind of business model that financing enterprises (borrowing enterprises) deposit their inventory in logistics enterprises (the Third Party) appointed by banks (lending enterprises),and apply for loans from the bank. Due to the information asymmetry,SMEsˊ default risk and moral hazard exist objectively;and there exists multilateral games in the decision-making behaviors among banks,logistics enterprises,and SMEs.Under the conditions of market-based lending rates,with the comprehensive consideration of such factors as SMEs'investment rate of return and project success rate, bank's loan interest rate and pledge rate,and reputation value,for default risk and moral hazard in SMEs'borrowing,the authors establish the incomplete information static state game between banks and SMEs,and the evolution game model under the precondition of bounded rationality and find out the solution of that.It is found that banks can effectively control the financing risk of small and medium-sized borrowing companies by setting appropriate loan interest rates and pledge rates to realize the satisfied loan performance ratio;and reducing verification costs,increasing penalties for breach of contract,and adopting a dual incentive mechanism combining reputation value and honesty and rewards can effectively prevent SMEsˊmoral hazard and encourage them to adopt an honest business strategy.%存货质押融资是指融资企业(借款企业)将其所拥有的存货交给银行(贷款企业)指定的物流企业(第三方)保管,然后向银行申请贷款,获得融资的一种新型商业模式.由于信息不对称,中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险客观存在,银行、物流企业、中小企业之间的决策行为存在着多方博弈.在贷款利率市场化条件下,综合考虑中小企业的投资收益率和项目成功率、银行的贷款利率和质押率,以及声誉价值等因素,针对中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险,分别建立银行与中小企业的不完全信息静态博弈和有限理性下的演化博弈模型并求解,结果表明:银行通过设置适当的贷款利率和质押率,可以有效控制中小借款企业的融资风险,促使其投资风险更小和收益更合理的项目,以实现满意的借款履约率;而减少核查成本、加大违约处罚,并且采取声誉价值与诚实奖励相结合的双重激励机制,可以有效防范中小企业道德风险,促使其采取诚实经营策略.