Russian income policy and interest groups: An illusion of corporatism.

摘要

The dissertation is a case study of Russia's six largest labor and business associations and their participation in making of the national income policy in 1994-95. It focuses on the associations' organizational structure and their relations with one another and with the state. The minimum wage indexation and management of the Single Tariff System were selected as the income policy issues. The policy coordination among the associations and the effectiveness of their participation in the policy process were examined. The dissertation framework distinguishes between four major types of interest intermediation and their combinations: pluralism, corporatism, syndicalism, and monism.; The author claims that the organizational structure and political networks of the six labor and business associations are indicative of a pluralist form of interest intermediation. Most associations are loosely organized and have little control over their members. They regularly compete with one another both for membership and influence on government policy. This pluralist pattern of interest group organization resulted from the decentralization of Russia's trade unions in the late 1980s and subsequent disagreements which arose among the associations over Russia's economic reforms and union organization.; On the policy process test, minimum wage indexation and management of the Single Tariff System are closer to a monist pattern. All stages and the output of the policy process are clearly dominated by the government. The primary reason for the monist pattern is that the government transformed both the minimum wage and the ETS into a tool of macroeconomic planning.; The coexistence of the pluralist organization of labor and business associations and the monist pattern of policy making can be a result of the transitional character of Russian politics at the moment.