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The development of Kant's transcendental ideal: Leibnizian metaphysics, Newtonian method, and the God of the philosophers.

机译:康德先验理想的发展:莱布尼兹形而上学,牛顿方法和哲学家的上帝。

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摘要

In the Critique of Pure Reason the belief that "existence is not a real predicate" anchors the rejection of the ontological proof for the existence of God, and all theoretical knowledge of God in turn. In his pre-critical period, however, Kant put forward an a priori proof for the existence of God, the "proof from possibility," while holding the same view of existence. And the account of the idea of God in the first Critique, the "transcendental ideal," is similar enough to the earlier proof that it can be seen as a proof shifted to the purely noumenal level, i.e., a concept we must think but can never know. Given these links between the critical and pre-critical periods, what-factors forced the transformation of the proof into the transcendental ideal? And how could Kant even offer an a priori proof in the early writings when he was already convinced that existence wasn't a real predicate, and so could not be known through conceptual analysis?; This dissertation illuminates the background and development of Kant's often perplexing discussion of God. At its three crucial stages, Kant's treatment of ontotheology is an encounter between his rationalist heritage and a philosophic method adopted from Newton. Chapter I examines this background in Leibniz and Newton. Chapter II looks at Kant's first metaphysical treatise, the Nova dilucidatio (1755), and its objections to rationalism. Chapter III looks at the zenith of Kantian rational theology in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763), and argues that the proof from possibility relies on an application of Newtonian method to metaphysics. Chapters IV and V examine the proof in the changed landscape of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Since human intuition is restricted to the sensible, the category of reality can no longer apply to the supersensible, and the proof loses its force. As a regulative idea, however, the concept of God "completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge" (A641/B669); expressing a primordial unity within diversity, the transcendental ideal accounts for the projected systematic unity of our knowledge, and God retains a deep and shadowy presence in the critical philosophy.
机译:在“纯粹理性批判”中,“存在不是真正的谓词”这一信念锚定了对上帝存在的本体论证据和所有关于上帝的理论知识的拒绝。然而,康德在他的前批判时期提出了关于上帝存在的先验证据,即“从可能性中证明”,同时保持了同样的存在观点。而且,在第一个批判中对神的观念的解释,即“超验的理想”与早期的证明足够相似,可以将其视为纯粹的本体论层面的证明,即,我们必须思考但可以不知道考虑到关键时期和前关键时期之间的这些联系,是什么因素迫使证明转化为先验理想?当康德已经确信存在不是真正的谓词,因此无法通过概念分析得知时,他怎么能在早期著作中提供先验证明呢?这篇论文阐明了康德关于上帝的经常困惑的讨论的背景和发展。在康德的三个关键阶段,他对本体论的处理是他的理性主义传统与牛顿采用的哲学方法之间的一次相遇。第一章考察了莱布尼兹和牛顿的这种背景。第二章介绍了康德的第一个形而上学著作,《新光明》(Nova dilucidatio,1755年)及其对理性主义的反对。第三章研究了康德理性神学的顶峰,即《论证上帝存在的唯一可能论证》(1763),并指出,可能性的证明依赖于牛顿方法在形而上学上的应用。第四章和第五章考察了《纯理性批判》(1781)的变化景观中的证明。由于人类的直觉仅限于明智的事物,因此现实的范畴不再适用于超理性的人,并且证明失去了作用。然而,作为一种调节性的思想,上帝的概念“使人类知识的全部完成并加冕”(A641 / B669)。为了表达多样性中的原始统一性,先验的理想说明了我们知识的计划系统统一性,而上帝在批判哲学中保留了深刻而隐蔽的存在。

著录项

  • 作者

    McNamara, Steven Robert.;

  • 作者单位

    Boston College.;

  • 授予单位 Boston College.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.; Theology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1998
  • 页码 289 p.
  • 总页数 289
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;宗教;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:48:48

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