This dissertation examines the complexities and flux in the conceptualization of the generic Western concept of “religion” in the course of social, cultural, and political movements from late-Qing to early Republican China. Central to the study is the indeterminacy of meaning in the transition from Chinese traditional discourse on jiao to the Western modern one on “religion,” and how the collision of these two discourses affected the evaluation of Chinese elite of their traditions as well as their agenda on the transformation of China. Before “religion” was introduced into China, the traditional discourse of “jiao (teaching)” defined cultural traditions. Confucianism was placed at the center of comparisons and considered to be the archetypal jiao. When the modern Chinese equivalent to the foreign concept of “religion/zongjiao ” gradually overwhelmed the antiquated usage of jiao and became a legitimate category in cultural discourse, the religiosity of Confucianism became a point of controversy that has inextricably haunted the modern Chinese history since.; Mainly prompted by worldly concerns, the “Defending Confucianism” movement in the late Qing still oriented its discussions from within the traditional framework of jiao. Regardless of their philosophical and political differences, Kang Youwei and his contemporaries shared the pressing need to popularize Confucianism and make Confucianism more accessible to commoners, who had long been ignored as a source of support. As the predominance of Confucianism over other jiao was diminished along with the overthrow of monarchial order, the Confucian Religion Association (kongjiao hui ) established in 1912 signifies that Confucianism had to compete with those jiao that were now categorized as “religious” groups. Initiated by the Confucian Religion Association, the debate over the enshrinement of Confucianism as the National Religion in the making of the constitution engenders much disjunction and confusion. This can be attributed to difficulties arising from trying to reshape the traditional relationship between zheng (government) and jiao (Confucianism) according to the Western notion of the modern nation-state on the one hand and the neologism “religion” on the other. In fact, the notion of a written “constitution,” and the implications of a bifurcation between church and state were utterly foreign to the Chinese mind of the time, and are perhaps even still misunderstood by some to this day.; The neologism “religion” was inevitably imprinted onto Chinese discourse at the turn of the century as “Western jiao,” with all the colored associations of the West's colonialist and proselytizing encounter with China. The Chinese perception of “religion,” then, was evidently affected and deflected by their understanding of Christianity. This bias was consequently embodied in the partial convergence of the Anti-Religious Campaign and Anti-Christian Campaign in 1920s. Religion in general was delineated as a misleading “superstition” that would delude the populace. For many intellectuals the mission of “enlightening the populace” entailed the emancipation of all people from every form of “superstition,” understood to be “religion.” Consequently, the advocacy of the Confucian religion was engulfed by a counter-current to de-religionize Confucianism, a movement which has basically set the tone for many decades to come.; Yet, Confucianism as a “religion” was and is not doomed. While Western religious discourse has been questioning the identification of Confucianism, the ambiguous nature of Confuci
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