Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula under Yeltsin (1991-96)

摘要

Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was one that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet period. Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, had to make a fundamental re-evaluation of its policies towards the Korean peninsula in accordance with a newly emerging post-Soviet system and with rapid domestic changes during this transitional period. Ultimately, this led Russia to a policy towards the Korean peninsula that, rather than remaining firm, was in constant flux. The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term based on a systematic and analytic approach. For this purpose, on the one hand, the thesis discusses how Russia has attempted to build up its new bilateral relations with the two states on the Korean peninsula to maximise its national interests in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, the thesis discusses how Russia has attempted to maintain its role and influence in relation to Korean issues among other major powers in Northeast Asia. To this end, special attention is given to an examination of Russia's major concerns regarding the Korean peninsula, both at the bilateral and regional levels. The thesis also argues that Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be divided into the following three stages: (1) Still New Political Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) Reformulating Russia's New Foreign Policy Consensus towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 93-Dec. 95); and (3) Towards a Full-Scale Balanced Korean Policy (Dec. 95- Jul. 96). This periodisation of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula is mainly based on Yeltsin's power consolidation in Russian politics in several Russian elections, which had a formative role in developing its new foreign policy direction as well as its domestic policies. The thesis draws the conclusion that Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term gradually became 'reactive' in several distinct stages while not having a solid consensus within its own leadership both at the bilateral and regional levels, although Russia did attempt to pursue an 'active' policy towards the Korea peninsula.