In this dissertation, I review the US government's experience with humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era. After a broad ranging discussion of international humanitarianism and its contemporary challenges, I describe how the Bush and Clinton Administrations responded to humanitarian crises in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and explain why they behaved as they did. I found the most important factors determining policy to fall under three categories—soft security concerns, humanitarian concerns, and domestic political concerns. Unfortunately, (but not surprisingly) no useful explanatory theory of humanitarian interventions falls out of the analysis. My research does, however, indicate that many of the factors often thought to be crucial in determining administration responses were rarely central motivations or impediments to action in these six cases. And when they were important, they worked in conflicting or unexpected ways. The evidence suggests a US president has much leeway in responding to humanitarian crises. He/she is not as tethered by the media, Congress, the Pentagon, or the general public as many people think.
展开▼
