Stories and past lessons: Understanding United States decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention in the post-Cold War era.

摘要

What factors appear influential to U.S. decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention? Utilizing the "story model" mode of problem representation first utilized by psychologists Pennington and Hastie (1986; 1988) and adapted to the domain of foreign policy by Sylvan and Charlick-Paley (2000), this research seeks to answer this question by exploring how top decision makers within the Bush and Clinton administrations collectively represented problems in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the early to mid-nineteen nineties. In particular, it explores whether decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention appear linked to: (1) the invocation of historical analogies, (2) perceptions of threats and or opportunities to vital national interests, (3) perceived moral/legal imperatives, (4) pressure and interests related to domestic actors, such as the Congress, the public and the media, (5) institutional pressures and interests pertaining to U.S. membership in international organizations or alliances, such as NATO and or the United Nations, (6) the perceived relative ease and utility of intervention, and (7) vested military interests. An analysis of the collective elite discourse and evolving representations (or "stories") of each crisis reveals, among other things, that decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention appear strongly linked to perceived pressure and interests pertaining to U.S. membership in international institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO and to perceptions of the relative ease and utility of such intervention. In addition, although analogies appear to influence and constrain elite representations of problems, they were invoked in the discourse in a piecemeal as opposed to a holistic fashion. Meanwhile analogies of past foreign policy "failures" and "successes" did not appear to correlate with decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention as originally posited, although a correlation did exist when stories were classified according to a less stringent "activist" or "nonactivist" classification. Finally, the research also supports the importance of perceived domestic pressure---notably public opinion---to intervention decisions; the importance of "multilateralism" as a norm constraining elite decision making; and the tendency on behalf of decision makers to "demonize" one actor or groups of actors in extended conflict situations.