In this paper, I explore the question of whether or not an unmarried man is morally required to pay child support in the case of an unintended pregnancy, and whether or not the current legal statutes can be morally justified.;In Section I of this paper, I offer a brief summary of current paternity laws. In Section II, I object to the soundness of the state's main argument for these laws; the moral argument that supposedly justifies paternity statutes assumes that both parties shared equally in creating the pregnancy, and that both therefore bear equal responsibility for support of their progeny. The law purports to uphold the equal standing of the two parties, and in so doing, protect the welfare of the child. However, I seek to show that the state has conflated two separate notions of responsibility and is mistaken as to which notion of this concept the law should apply. In Section III, I offer an argument in support of changing current paternity laws. I seek to show that, if the state's interest is to distribute equal benefits and burdens, then the father should not be required by law to pay child support in cases where pregnancy is unintended and the father prefers adoption or abortion. Section IV concludes with a survey of possible moral and pragmatic implications resulting from such a change and offers a weaker version of my thesis, which suggests that, morally (but not legally), the father should contribute some financial assistance---but not for reasons of responsibility and to a much lesser extent than currently required.
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