How children think, feel, and hurt each other: An examination of the moral and emotional moderators and mediators of aggressive behavior.

摘要

The purpose of the present study was three-fold: to determine whether moral reasoning predicts current and future aggression, to examine whether moral reasoning affects the stability of aggression over time, and to explore the moral and emotional processes involved in two specific functions of aggression (i.e., proactive and reactive). Gender differences in each of these relationships were also investigated. Students were initially assessed during the fall of first or second grade and were re-examined during the winter or spring of third, fourth, or fifth grade. Concurrent relationships between moral reasoning and aggression were expected at both time points. Early moral reasoning was expected to moderate the stability of overt aggression over time, such that hedonistic reasoning would be associated with increases in aggression and psychological needs-oriented reasoning with decreases. Emotions were expected to mediate the relationship of moral reasoning to proactive and reactive aggression. Hedonistic reasoning was expected to facilitate reactive aggression by promoting anger and/or shame, and to facilitate proactive aggression by inhibiting empathy and/or guilt. The opposite relationships were expected for psychological needs-oriented reasoning (i.e., it would promote empathy and/or guilt, inhibit anger and/or shame, and thus fail to facilitate either proactive or reactive aggression).; Although results varied depending upon the specific variables examined, support was generally found for both concurrent and longitudinal relations between moral reasoning and aggression. Psychological needs-oriented reasoning in early elementary school predicted aggressive behavior in later elementary school but was not associated with different rates of aggression and thus did not moderate the stability of aggression over time. Contrary to predictions, emotions did not mediate the relationship between moral reasoning and aggression. In fact, with one important exception (i.e., a negative relationship between early imminent reasoning and later guilt), moral reasoning and moral emotions were largely unrelated. Guilt was also negatively related to peer-nominated proactive and reactive aggression and to teacher-reported overt aggression. Results have important implications for theory, research, and practice.