The 1962 border conflict between the People's Republic of China and India, though small in scale, led to the devastation of multiple unprepared and underequipped Indian brigades, and resulted in a major victory for the fledgling People's Liberation Army (PLA). Although there have been numerous research efforts covering the conflict, most only focus on the diplomatic lead-up and fallout of the war. The very few sources dedicated to the operational history of the conflict overwhelmingly rely on Indian and Western sources. This thesis uses original Chinese sources and previously classified U.S. intelligence documents to provide an in-depth look into the strategies and tactics adopted by the PLA for the war, while also utilizing previous research efforts to balance the approach. It allows for an alternative look from the Chinese point of view in explaining why the PLA was so successful in 1962. This research effort includes brief histories of the border disagreement and of the PLA that explain the root causes of the war and demonstrate why the Chinese were better prepared for the conflict. Additionally, a play-by-play of all the major battles during the month-long war, down to company-level, is provided to further illustrate how effective the PLA was against an outmatched Indian opponent. Finally, extensive research into Chinese general officer biographies and unit histories, operational planning and strategy, lessons learned from the Korean War, Chinese refusal to escalate the conflict, logistical support, and Indian military leadership all present further evidence that the PLA victory was not simply a result of numerical superiority and failures by the Indian government.
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