The Sino-Indian border dispute: A study of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China

摘要

The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet in 1954 seemed to have carried with it the implication that both sides admitted the fait accompli along their common border and the respective areas of influence in the Himalayas. However, with the Himalayan situation deteriorating against India, and the decline of India's prestige in the Afro-Asian community after the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nehru, in 1958, began the border dispute by sending reconnaissance parties to the Aksai Chin which had been under Chinese occupation.;From 19959 to 1962, India had used force to recover part of the Aksai Chin. The Chinese met this challenge with a massive counterattack in October 1962 with the aim of retaining control over the Aksai Chin, an area which is of great strategic importance to China. Therefore, it is a mistake to cite the Sino-Indian border conflict as proof that the present Chinese government is essentially aggressive. In fact, it would seem that had India agreed to negotiate on the basis of the existing actualities, or to maintain the status quo on the border, China would have preferred to avoid an armed conflict with India. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).