Counterfeits, Crystal Meth and Nuclear Weapons: State-Sponsored Illicit Flows and the Future of Proliferation.

摘要

Empowered by the forces of economic globalization, international illicit flows of people, goods and technology have surged in recent years, especially since the end of the Cold War. The dominant view of this phenomenon is that it is driven by nonstate actors at the expense of states. This dissertation argues that many illicit flows of people, goods and technology are in fact directed or enabled by states. These "state-sponsored illicit flows" are not uncommon, and some types are even pervasive. States use illicit flows to generate revenue, to procure illicit goods and to increase their territorial control. This dissertation examines a specific subset of state-sponsored illicit flows. Namely, I examine the black and grey markets in nuclear weapons technology. Using archival sources supplemented by interviews, I look at Pakistan, Iraq and Libya, three states that have used illicit flows to advance their nuclear weapons programs. These case studies lead to important conclusions about the relationship between states and illicit flows and about proliferation in general. For one, states are quite resilient. The methods that nonstate actors use to evade state control may be used by states as well. Secondly, the relationship between states and illicit flows is more complicated than commonly perceived. While the weak states of the developing world may be particularly vulnerable to illicit flows, they may also be uniquely positioned to benefit from the same phenomenon. Given the complexity of the matter, this dissertation underlines the degree to which additional research is needed to better understand the relationship between states and illicit flows. Proliferation via illicit flows is a viable method of proliferation, and it is not likely to go away. The base technologies required for nuclear development are more widely available on the world market than in the 1970s. The communication and transportation technologies that have aided all trade have made it easier for firms to anonymously provide nuclear-sensitive materials. These trends will continue, and the threshold required for a state to become a nuclear power will be lowered further.