Administrative reform of United States and Japanese education: Elite state entrepreneurs reorganize national education systems.

摘要

The U.S. and Japan have markedly different education systems, with different historical development, social norms, and institutional structures. Yet in both the U.S. and Japan, education governance systems endured for decades and then suddenly changed in the early 1990s. Applying and expanding John Kingdon's garbage can model, the study describes changes in problem, policy, and politics streams that led to similar reform timing and content, even in such different cases as the U.S. and Japan. Reform timing was similar because during the 1980s consensus grew in both countries that failing schools threatened economic competitiveness and restructuring authority would help. Reform content was similar because reformers drew from a common reform menu, the New Public Management (NPM). Although NPM reforms recommended a "loose-tight" approach holding schools tightly accountable for their performance but giving schools significant autonomy, neither U.S. nor Japanese reforms provided schools with autonomy.; Based on 122 interviews with U.S. and Japanese policymakers, this dissertation argues that entrepreneurial politicians and bureaucrats are responsible for this outcome. It traces four reform episodes: (1) Japanese Program for Education Reform, (2) Japanese Trinity Reform, (3) "Goals 2000" and 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), and (4) 2002 ESEA reauthorization, No Child Left Behind.; The episodes demonstrate that reform models did not drive reform outcomes. Presidents and prime ministers participated in reform primarily as a symbolic activity that would win elections. They were more interested in winning big victories than in the details of the victories. On the other hand, elite bureaucrats were very interested in reform details. They participated in reform to protect and expand their turf.; As a result of this dynamic---politicians engaged in symbolic politics while bureaucrats fought turf wars---bureaucrats were able to hijack reform agendas. Instead of empowering schools, reform actually empowered bureaucrats, especially over curriculum and budgets. Bureaucrats also frustrated proposed reforms that would have given parents school choice or given principals power to build school teams. As a result, both U.S. and Japanese schools lack authority to innovate, and many teachers have become stressed and disillusioned.