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After justification: Moral epistemology in H. T. Engelhardt, Jr.'s 'Foundations of Bioethics'.

机译:辩解之后:小恩格哈特的《生物伦理学基础》中的道德认识论。

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A central question for moral epistemology is how our moral beliefs are justified. In his Foundations of Bioethics, Hugo Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. argues that modern secular philosophy fails to provide a justification for moral belief. Despite this failure, which he equates with the failure of the "Enlightenment project," Engelhardt claims that we can peacefully collaborate by respecting one another's ability to agree or give permission.;In this essay, I respond to Engelhardt's critique of secular philosophy and his proposal for secular morality on the basis of permission. I compare Engelhardt's work with that of Alasdair MacIntyre, Harry G. Frankfurt, Gilbert Harman, David Lewis, and Jeffrey Stout on related questions. Engelhardt's proposal doesn't give us the "content-less" morality he claims it does. Far from being a purely formal concept, his notion of permission relies directly on many shared assumptions, particularly about the nature of freedom. Engelhardt actually describes a convention of morality that closely resembles our own current conventions of behavior toward strangers. Engelhardt's skeptical attack on secular moral philosophy is ineffective because it assumes a flawed concept of justification. A more robust kind of justification, built on Harman's conservatism, resists Engelhardt's skepticism. Moral philosophy isn't incapable of providing justification for our moral beliefs.;Justification is a process of fitting our beliefs together to reach reflective equilibrium. It relies on shared conventions of thought and action that are elements of our culture. It doesn't rely on a special foundation of unimpeachable belief, but takes account of all our relevant beliefs. Justification isn't just a matter of what we think but of how we think. When we say our beliefs are justified, we mean that until proven otherwise, we've gathered our beliefs properly and we think we're right. Justification isn't perfect or infallible, but it's how we form the best beliefs we can.
机译:道德认识论的一个中心问题是我们的道德信仰如何合理。小雨果·特里斯特拉姆·恩格哈特(Hugo Tristram Engelhardt,Jr.)在他的《生物伦理学基础》中指出,现代世俗哲学无法为道德信仰提供辩护。尽管失败了,但他等同于“启蒙计划”的失败,恩格哈特声称我们可以通过尊重彼此的同意或给予同意的能力来和平合作。;在这篇文章中,我回应了恩格哈特对世俗哲学及其批评的批评。在允许的基础上提出世俗道德的建议。在相关问题上,我将恩格哈特的作品与阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔,哈里·G·法兰克福,吉尔伯特·哈曼,戴维·刘易斯和杰弗里·斯托特的作品进行了比较。恩格哈特的提议并没有给我们他所宣称的“无内容”道德。他的许可概念远非纯粹的形式概念,而是直接依赖于许多共同的假设,尤其是关于自由的性质。恩格哈特(Engelhardt)实际上描述了一种道德习俗,与我们目前对陌生人的行为习俗非常相似。恩格哈特(Engelhardt)对世俗道德哲学的怀疑性攻击是无效的,因为它假定了有缺陷的辩护概念。以哈曼的保守主义为基础的更强有力的辩护抵制了恩格哈特的怀疑主义。道德哲学并非不能为我们的道德信念提供辩护。正义是将我们的信念融合在一起以达到反思性平衡的过程。它依赖于我们文化中共同的思想和行动惯例。它不依赖于坚不可摧的信念的特殊基础,而是考虑了我们所有相关的信念。合理性不仅与我们的想法有关,还与我们的想法有关。当我们说我们的信念是合理的时,我们的意思是除非另行证明,否则我们已经正确地收集了我们的信念,我们认为我们是对的。证明并非完美无误,但它是我们如何形成最佳信念的方式。

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