首页> 外文会议>Wuhan International Conference on E-Business; 20070526-27; Wuhan(CN) >Influence of Institutional Ownership on Cash Dividend Policy of China Listed Companies
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Influence of Institutional Ownership on Cash Dividend Policy of China Listed Companies

机译:机构所有权对中国上市公司现金红利政策的影响

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According to agency theory, cash dividends can effectively restrain the self-interest behavior of corporation managers and prevent managers to hurt the interest of stockholders. If institutional investors have enough stockholdings, they perhaps can exert influence on corporation decisions and make managers distribute more cash dividends. By the construction of cash dividend decision model based on the protection of stockholders' interest, this paper uses the data of China manufacturing listed companies from 2001 to 2003 to make empirical study. We find that in China listed companies, institutional ownership has positive relation with the payout of cash dividends. Finally, this paper points that an effective way to deal with the current low cash dividend policy of China listed companies is to develop institutional investors and increase their stockholdings percentage.
机译:按照代理理论,现金股利可以有效地抑制公司经理人的自我利益行为,防止经理人损害股东利益。如果机构投资者拥有足够的股份,他们也许可以对公司的决策施加影响,并使经理人分配更多的现金股利。通过建立基于股东利益保护的现金分红决策模型,本文利用2001年至2003年中国制造业上市公司的数据进行实证研究。我们发现,在中国的上市公司中,机构所有权与现金股利的支付正相关。最后,本文指出,应对当前中国上市公司的低现金分红政策的有效途径是发展机构投资者和增加其持股比例。

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