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Institutional stock ownership and firms' cash dividend policies: Evidence from China

机译:机构股权和企业的现金股利政策:来自中国的证据

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Agency theory suggests that outside shareholders prefer higher dividend payouts in order to reduce the free cash flows of firms that are under the insiders' control. Our study investigates the effects of mutual funds, typically the most important and influential type of outside shareholder, on firms' dividend payouts in China during the period from 2003 to 2011. We find that mutual funds influence firms to pay higher cash dividends. The results are consistent with the predictions from exit theory. The effects are more pronounced in firms controlled by state and regional governments and in firms with relatively higher free cash flows. We also find evidence that the mutual funds' effects are stronger when their investment horizon is longer and the ownership interest is larger. Other institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and securities companies have a lower exit threat and do not have an influence on firms' cash dividend payments or financial performances. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:代理理论认为,外部股东更愿意支付更高的股息,以减少受内部人控制的公司的自由现金流。我们的研究调查了共同基金(通常是最重要和最有影响力的外部股东类型)对2003年至2011年期间中国公司的股利支付的影响。我们发现,共同基金影响公司支付更高的现金股利。结果与出口理论的预测一致。这种影响在州和地区政府控制的公司以及自由现金流相对较高的公司中更为明显。我们还发现有证据表明,共同基金的投资期限越长,所有权权益越大,其作用就越强。银行,保险公司和证券公司等其他机构投资者的退出威胁较小,并且对公司的现金股利支付或财务业绩没有影响。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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