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Family control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

机译:家庭控制,制度环境和现金股利政策:来自中国的证据

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Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.
机译:本研究以2004年至2008年期间的1486家中国A股上市公司为样本,通过实证检验了家族控制,机构环境及其相互作用对上市公司现金股利政策的影响。我们的结果表明:(1)家族企业的现金股利支付率和支付股息的倾向均低于非家族企业; (2)有利的区域制度环境对现金股利支付率和支付上市公司股利的倾向具有重大的积极影响; (3)与非家族企业相比,家族企业中区域机构环境对现金股利的影响更大。令人惊讶的是,我们发现中国的控股家族股东可能会加剧代理问题I(所有者与经理之间的冲突),而不是代理问题II(控股股东与中小股东之间的冲突),从而对现金股利政策产生重大负面影响。相反,有利的区域制度环境在缓解代理问题一和鼓励家族企业支付现金股利方面起着积极的公司治理作用。

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