Political Relation, Rent-seeking Environment and Financing Constraint of Private Enterprise

摘要

FHP explains the existence of financing constraint from the perspective of information asymmetry. It is to be discussed that whether political relation reduces the information asymmetry between enterprises and financial institutions or through power rentseeking between executives and government officials, to influence the constraint of private enterprises. From rent-seeking perspective, this paper studies the mechanism between political relation and financing constraint by building game theory model,and with the sample of enterprises in regulated industries, creatively designs empirical method to verify the theoretical results. This paper believes that political relation reduces the financing constraint of private enterprise by rent-seeking mechanism. In non-market oriented resource allocation area,private enterprise in regulated industries could avoid financing constraint by rent-seeking no matter it has political relation. In market-oriented resource allocation area,political relation could reduce the cost of rent-seeking to make private enterprise to avoid financing constraint.