Game Theory Approach for Pricing Problem in Entertainment Supply Chain: Abstract ID: 789203

摘要

An entertainment supply chain (ESC) includes performer, promoters, event facility, and online ticket agencies. Determining the right ticket price is a vital decision that remarkably affects the profit of the entertainment supply chain players. Moreover, in some cases, the ticket price is the primal factor for audiences to attend an event. Pricing is indicated by the interactions between various stockholders in the ESC. In this study, we present a game-theoretical method to examine the ticket pricing in an ESC such as music concert, live show, ballet, and theater plays. Integrated, Stackelberg and Nash models are studied to reflect the real market channel condition in ESC. The result highlights the optimal ticket price and total profit for members of ESC. Further, the optimal decision for each player according to its role (leader or follower) in ESC is investigated. The results indicated that centralized ESC, in which a central company manages ticket selling process, makes more profit rather than decentralized structure. It is also proved that the role of event center does not change its total profit remarkably. The finding of this paper can be applied by entertainment industry practitioners to make a better decision about pricing strategy under competitive market.