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Sustainable municipal solid waste disposal supply chain analysis under price-sensitive demand: A game theory approach

机译:价格敏感需求下的可持续城市垃圾处理供应链分析:一种博弈论方法

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The impacts of price and sustainability on municipal waste disposal demand have largely been ignored by waste management researchers. This paper considers a waste disposal supply chain that includes a disposal facility and a contractor. Both parties try to improve source sorting for waste collection to reduce the recycling cost at the disposal facility. Improving source sorting requires investment that would increase the price of the waste disposal service, thereby affecting the price-sensitive demand. The relationship between the service price and investments in waste sorting motives is analyzed in this paper via studying the trade-off between the optimal source sorting and the waste disposal service prices. Different scenarios based on the various players' power structures are developed. Nash and Stackelberg games have been applied in order to find the optimal decision values in each scenario. The impact of cost sharing on optimal supply chain decisions is also studied. The numerical results show that the waste supply chain is more profitable when it is working under an integrated management structure. Moreover, reducing the required investment motivates supply chain players to select higher levels of waste sorting at the source. A numerical example is provided, followed by some managerial insights.
机译:价格和可持续性对市政废物处理需求的影响在很大程度上被废物管理研究人员所忽略。本文考虑了包括处置设施和承包商的废物处置供应链。双方都试图改善废物收集的来源分类,以减少处置设施的回收成本。改善来源分类需要投资,这将增加废物处理服务的价格,从而影响对价格敏感的需求。通过研究最优源分类与废物处理服务价格之间的权衡,分析了服务价格与废物分类动机投资之间的关系。根据各种参与者的权力结构,开发了不同的方案。为了找到每种情况下的最佳决策值,已经应用了Nash和Stackelberg游戏。还研究了成本分摊对最佳供应链决策的影响。数值结果表明,在一体化管理结构下,废物供应链更有利可图。此外,减少所需的投资会促使供应链参与者从源头上选择更高级别的废物分类。提供了一个数字示例,然后提供了一些管理方面的见解。

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