DEVELOPING A COMPETENT CRITICALITY SAFETY PROGRAM: A RETROSPECTIVE

摘要

This paper considers the role of a nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program in protection of the nuclear facilities personnel as well as its mission and finances. It will discuss the author's experiences in assessing and strengthening the NCS program at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant following the 1978 criticality accident. The weaknesses in the program illuminated by the event and the structural changes that resulted will be discussed. The upgrades to the development of the Criticality Safety Evaluation process, the strengthening of the implementation of limits and controls and the defense of the enhanced program in later years will be presented. The author's experiences with various problems in the NCS program at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado will also be detailed. The core problem of the disconnect between the NCS staff and the operators was addressed by a careful and cooperative rebuilding of the program by safety and operation staff. A key element in the new program was a clear assignment of responsibility for each program element and the role of a Criticality Safety Officer in each facility, reporting to and representing operations, in managing the communication flow and assuring the program field implementation so that the criticality risk reduction was as intended. From these practical experiences in focusing on identifying NCS program weaknesses and subsequent problem resolution, recommendation will be provided for elements of a robust NCS program.