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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Strategies Selection of Technological Progress in Service Outsourcing

机译:服务外包技术进步策略选择的进化博弈分析

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Technological progress of service outsourcing enterprise exists strategic selections-independent innovation and relying on technology spillover.The evolutionary game model is established to analyze the effect of innovation benefits, government subsidies, R&D costs and absorption profits on strategic selections. The conclusions show that, (1) The service outsourcing enterprise stably choosing independent innovation or relying on technology spillover is depended on the comparison of their profits; (2) The increase of innovation benefits and government subsidies, and the decrease of R&D costs and absorption profits, are helpful for the service outsourcing enterprises' strategic selections from relying on technology spillover to independent innovation. Finally, the results are proved by numerical simulation experiments.
机译:服务外包企业的技术进步存在独立的选择 - 独立创新,依靠技术溢出。建立了进化博弈模型,分析了创新效益,政府补贴,研发成本和对战略选择的吸收利润的影响。结论表明,(1)服务外包企业稳定选择自主创新或依靠技术溢出措施,取决于其利润的比较; (2)创新福利和政府补贴的增加以及研发成本和吸收利润的降低,有助于服务外包企业从依托技术溢出到自主创新。最后,通过数值模拟实验证明了结果。

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