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An Empirical Study on Relationship Between Governance Mechanism of Debt Financing and Corporate Comprehensive Performance

机译:债务融资与企业综合绩效的治理机制关系的实证研究

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The relationship between corporate governance mechanism of debt financing and corporate comprehensive performance has been studied in this paper based on the financial data of 1110 listed companies. Effects of four approaches of debt financing mechanism working on corporate performance have also been analyzed thoroughly. It has been found out that,in most of the listed companies of China, functions of debt financing mechanisms are worsening. Among all of these four approaches,controller benefit's incentive mechanism and restrictive mechanism of free cash flow can help promote comprehensive performance by successfully inspiring shareholders' motivation to take part in corporate governance on one hand and restricting the possibility of managers' abusing free cash flow on the other. However,financial leverage's worsening and the failure of information transmission mechanism have weakened the positive effect of debt governance mechanism towards corporate comprehensive performance on the whole.
机译:本文研究了1110家上市公司财务数据的债务融资和企业综合性绩效的公司治理机制与企业综合绩效的关系。彻底分析了四种债务融资机制方法的影响。已经发现,在中国上市公司的大多数,债务融资机制的功能正在恶化。在所有这四种方法中,控制员福利的激励机制和自由现金流量的限制机制可以通过成功鼓励股东在一方面参与公司治理并限制管理者滥用自由现金流动的可能性来帮助促进全面表现另一个。然而,金融杠杆的恶化和信息传动机制的失败削弱了债务治理机制整体企业综合性能的积极影响。

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